Pay day loan Store of Wisconsin v. City of Madison, 333 F. Supp. 2d 800 (W.D. Wis. 2004)

by astecadmin

Pay day loan Store of Wisconsin v. City of Madison, 333 F. Supp. 2d 800 (W.D. Wis. 2004)

333 F. Supp. 2d 800 (2004)

The PAY DAY LOAN SHOP OF WISCONSIN, INC. d/b/a Madison’s Money Express, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF MADISON, Defendant.

Usa District Court, W.D. Wisconsin.

*801 *802 Joseph S. Goode, Milwaukee, WI, for Plaintiff.

Amanda J. Kaiser, Boardman, Suhr, Curry & Field, Madison, WI, for Defendant.

CRABB, District Judge.

This will be a civil action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. В§ 1983. Plaintiff The pay day loan shop of Wisconsin contends that defendant City of Madison has enacted an ordinance that violates plaintiff’s legal rights to equal security and due procedure and it is unconstitutionally obscure. In addition, plaintiff contends that the ordinance is preempted by state law.

Whenever plaintiff filed its grievance, it desired an initial injunction to stop defendant from enforcing the presumably unconstitutional ordinance. Defendant reacted into the movement and presented a motion for summary judgment at the time that is same asserting that the appropriate concepts determining the motions had been exactly the same. Defendant asked that its movement for summary judgment be addressed without allowing plaintiff time for breakthrough, arguing that any finding could be unneeded. We agreed that development will never help plaintiff (because legislative choices are “not at the mercy of courtroom factfinding and might be centered on logical conjecture unsupported by proof or empirical data,” FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 124 L. Ed. 2d 211 (1993)), and offered its counsel a way to advise the court whether he desired a chance for extra briefing; he wrote towards the court on August 12, 2004, to state that extra briefing wouldn’t be necessary and that the court should go to determine the movement.

We conclude that defendant’s movement for summary judgment needs to be given because plaintiff cannot show that defendant lacked any basis that is rational legislating the nighttime closing of cash advance shops.

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